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Governments in a number of industtial countries have been for some years
under pressure to lower the tax burden and to reduce the budget deficit.
The only way to achieve both goals is to cut government spending. Of
course, politicians find this very hard to do and consequently try to cut
items o[ spending with a low political value. In practice, this means that
politicians find it much cheaper from an electoral point of view to cut gov-
ernment investment than to cut government coneumption. For government
conaumption there always is a very vocal constituency or lobby group which
is able to fight and resist cuts in expenditure. The fruits oí government
investment do not occur until some time has passed and politicians are typi-
cally to impatient to wait for that, being mostly interested in quick boosts to
electoral popularity. Politicians are typically short-sighted, especially when
the probability of being removed from office is high. In view of the new
theories of endogenous growth, the objective of this paper is to show that
the behaviour ofshort-sighted politicians promotes government consumption
and damages government investment and thus reduces the growth rate of
the economy. This suggests that the political economy of budget cuts which
are under way in many oí the industrial economies jeopardises growth and
weiiare. r,mpiricai evidence for such a pessimisiic view is given in Tauzi auu
Lutz (1990).
In order to have an interesting analysis of the political trade-off between
government consumption on the one hand and government investment and
growth on the other hand, it is essential to have at least four ingredients.
First, taxes must be distortionary so that there is a sound economic rea-
son to reduce the tax burden as far as is optimal. Second, the marginal
productivity of private capital and the economic growth rate must be en-
dogenous and depend among other things on the national income share of
government investment or productive government spending. Third, govern-
ment consumption must yield direct utility tor otherwise it is impossible to
have an optimal trade-off with private consumption and government invest-
ment. Fourth, the political discount rate may be higher than the social or
private rate of time preference as politicians face uncertainty about election
outcomes and thus have a shorter time horizon than households.
The new theories of endogenous growth abandon the assumption of di-
minishing returns to capital and, instead, assume constant returns to scale
with respect to a broad measure of the capital stock (Romer, 1986, 1989;
Lucas, 1988; Barro, 1990). This broad measure of the capital stock thus in-z
cludes the own capital stock, the capital stock of other firms and the stock of
government capital. Such a meaaure allows for production externalities aris-
ing fmm apill-overa of knowledge and ideas and for the efCect of productive
government spending on social infrastructure on the marginal productivity
of private capital and growth. Consumers maximise life-time utility. The
government has to make a trade-oR between a low tax rate, which reducea
distortions, and a high tax rate, which permits a larger national income
share of productive government spending and thua higher growth. In such a
world there are no transitional dynamics and maximising the growth rate of
the economy is, as long as production functions are of the Cobb-Douglas va-
riety, efficient in the sense that this corresponds to maximising social welfare
(Barro, 1990; Barro and Sala-i-Martin, 1990). However, if consumers also
value a high national income share of government consumption, maximising
the growtL rate of the economy is no longer equivalent to maximising social
welfare. The reason is that there is a second trade-off to be made, because
a higher shue of government consumption reduces prospects for growth un-
der distortionary taxation. Since a government discount rate which is higher
than the household discount rate reduces growth, it can be shown that short-
sighted politicians tend to jeopardise productive government spending on
social infrastructure and thus growth in favour of government consumption.
Section 2 ptesents a aimple model of endogenous growth, social iniras-
tructure and diatortionary taxation. Section 3 is based on Bazro (1990)
and Barro and Sala-i-Martin (1990) and shows that maximising growth is
equivalent to maximising social welfare in a model with a Cobb-Douglas pro-
duction function relating private output to private capital accumulation and
productive government epending on social infrastructure. However, for more
general production functions there is a trade-off between maximising growth
and maximising the current level of private consumption so that maximis-
ing growth is not neceasarily efficient. This point is demonstrated by some
numerical calculationa, which aze designed to illustrate the sensitivity of the
results with respect to the elasticity of substitution between private capi-
tal and productive govetnment spending. Section 4 introduces outlays on
government consumption of rival, non-excludable public goods and shows
that, in general, maximising growth is not equivalent to maximising so-
cial welfare, even when attention is restricted to Cobb-Douglas production
functions. Section 5 introduces short-sighted politicians with a higher dis-
count rate than the one used by households and shows that this crowds
out productive government spending in favour of government consumption
and consequently reduces growth prospects. Section 6 briefly examines the3
various outcomes when the government consumee rival, excludable public
goods. The main difference is that, tor a given national income ahaze of
government consumption, the optimal national income share of government
consumption is lower and the ehare of productive government epending is
higher than with rival, non-excludable public goods. In fact, when public
goods are rival and excludable, consumption of private and public goods can
be treated as a composite commodity so that the optimal national income
share ofproductive government spending equala the elasticity of output with
respect to productive government spending. Conversely, when congestion ef-
fecte are important, the optimal share of productive government spending
and rate of growth are lower.
Section 7 concludes with a summary of results.
2 Endogenous growth and productive government
spending
Preferences ofthe representative household are characterised by an intertem-





where C denotes private consumption and p denotes the households' pure
rate of time preference. The instantaneous utility function has a constant
elasticity of intertemporal substitution, o- -u'~Cu", that is u(C) -
Ct-é ~(1- ó), o~ 1 or u(C) - log(C), o- 1. The representative household
maximises (1) subject to its budget identity
Á(t) - r(t)A(t) ~ D(t) - C(t), ~lm exp[- Iv r(v')dv7A(v) - 0 (2)
where A and D denote wcalLh of and dividends received by households, and
~In Section 4 óoueehold utility also depende on the uational income ehare ofgovernment
coneumption. 1[ thie shsre entere the utility (unction in a eeparable [sehion, houeehold
behaviour ie unaffected.4
r denotes the market tate of interest, respectively. All labour income is fully
diversified, so private wealth (A) includes human capital. Dividends are
exempt from taxation; instead firms are taxed. This yields
C(t)~C(t) - o[r(t) - p] (3)
so that households save and postpone consumption when the market rate
of interest exceeds the pure rate of time preference, and more so when the
elasticity of intertemporal substitution is high. The preaent-value budget
constraint of the representative household then gives,for a constantinterest
rate 2, the consumption function:
C(t) - [ap-4- (1 - o)r][A(t) ~ ~~ exp(-r(v - t))D(v)dv] (4)
t
Private consumption is a constant proportion ofnon-human wealth plus the
present value of future dividends. This proportion increases with the pure
rate of time preference.
Technology is characterised by a Cobb-Douglas production with constant
returns to scale with respect to ttte private capital stock, K, and the level
of productive government spending on infrastructure, S:
Y-(BK)aSr-tr, B 1 0, 0 G a G 1 (5)
where Y denotes output and B denotes the exogenous efficiency of private
capital. One might expect the stock of productive government capital rather
than the 8ow of productive government spending to affect private produc-
tion, but this effect has been left out for analytical convenience. Firms
maximise under perfect competition the present value of net aíter-tax rev-
enues, so that the after-tax marginal productivity of capital must equal the
user cost of capital (i.e. the rental charge plus the depreciation charge):
,-a
(1-r)aB~y~ a -r~6 (6)
'Later on it ~.ill become dear that in this model the intereet rate ie indeed conatant.5
where b denotes the depreciation rate of the capital stock. For simplicity,
production externalities such as spill-overs of knowledge and learning by
doing are not considered. Firms make ptofits, becauae they obtain a return
on productive government spending for which they do not have to pay.
These profita are handed back to householda, so that dividends are given
byD-(1-r)Y-(rth)K.
The government levies distortionary taxes on income to finance spending
on public consumption, G, and on productive government spending:
GfS-rY. (7)
There is no government debt, so equilibrium in the capital market re-
quires that A- K. This is a cloaed economy, so that equilibrium in the
goods market requires that private consumption plus government spending
on consumption goods and infrastructure plus private investment must equal
production. This in turn must equal the national income:
CfGfSfKfáK-Y. (8)
It is possible to rewrite the model as a differential equation in the ratio
of private conaumption to private capital, c- C~K:
~~c-o((1-r)aBs~ -p]-Bs~(1-g-s)~cf (1-a)6 (9)
where g- G~Y and s- S~Y. If there are only unanticipated, permanent
shocks in g, s and r, there are no transitional dynamics and the saddlepoint
solution oí the above model ia given by:
c(s,r)-CjK-op-(1-o)6}(1-oa)(1-r)Bs'ó (10)
x(s,r)- K -Y - Bs~(1-9-s)-c-6-
0[(1- r)aBs~ - 6 - p] (11)s
9f9-T (12)
Equation (10) gives the reduced-form consumption function. The first part
of equation (11) is the Harrod-Domar rule, which says that the growth rate
of the economy must equal the savings rate (net of depreciation) divided
by the capital-output ratio. The second part of equation ( 11) is the Ram-
sey rule for the growth in private consumption, which together with the
Harrod-Domar rule can be solved to give equation (10). An increase in the
national income share of government spending requires a higher tax rate and
thus crowds out the national income share of private consumption, so there
aze less resources available for saving and investment and the growth rate
of the economy falls (a, G 0). Because the ratio of private consumption
to private capital falls (cr G 0), the level of private consumption falls on
impact. Subsequently, the growth rate of private consumption is lower as
well. However, if government spending is on inírastructure, the marginal
productivity of capital increases and this raises both the growth rate of the
economy and the ratio of private consumption to private capital (x, 1 0
and c, ~ 0 provided o G l~a). It follows that an increase in the national
income shaze of productive government spending increases on impact the
level of private consumption and subsequently increases the growth rate of
private consumption as well. If households become more impatient (higher
p), the ratio of private consumption to private capital increases and the
growth tate falls. These effects on the growth rate are magnified when the
elasticity of intertemporal substitution is higher, because then households
find it easier to postpone consumption. Equation (12) is the government
budget constraint.
3 Maximal growth is not necessarily efficient
This section is concerned with choosing budgetary policies to mauimise so-
cial welfare and develops some of the ideas in Bazro (1990) and Barro and
Sala-i-Martin (1990). For a given national income shaze of government con-
sumption 3, the government chooses the tax rate and thus the national
3This assumption is relaxed in Sections 4 and 5.7
income share of productive government spending on infrastructure to max-
imise the utility of the representatíve household. There is no population
growth. The government thus solves:





~ exp(-pt)[log(c(r - g,r)K(0)) t x(r - g, r)t]di (13')
0
if o- 1. Since the initial capital stock is at any point of time historically
given, (13) and (13') are equivalent to, respectively:
Max c(r - 9, r)1-ó 0 0 1 14
' P-(1-o)x(r-9,r)~ ~0-1~' ~ ( )
Max
rlog(c(r - 9, r))1 ~ (~(r - 9, r)1 ~- 1. (14') ` P J ` PZ J
Utility is bounded ptovided that p~(1 - ó)a. Maximisation gives rise to
the following first-order condition:
[P-(1-ó)~(r,g)]~~~(r'g))~fx,(r,g)-o (15)
where c(r, g) - c(r-g, r) and á(r,g) - a(r-g,r). It is clear from equations
(10)-(12) that both é, - 0 and ir, - 0 when
r-r"-1-a(1-g) (16)
This means that, as long as a G l~o, maximising growth is equivalent to
maximising the ratio of private consumption to private capital and thus
is equivalent to maximising social welfare. The optimal tax rate (16) is
the outcome of two opposing forces. A higher tax rate implies a higherR
national income share of productive government spending which stimulates
growth. However, a higher tax rate also increasea the distortionary impact of
taxation on private incentives to invest which slowa down economic growth
'. The optimal tax rate increases and the optimal national income ehare of
productive government spending,
s-s'-(1-a)(1-g), (17)
decreases when the national income share of government consumption in-
creases. It is interesting that the optimal outcome is independent of house-
hold preferences.
Note that, even when the government is short-sighted and adopts a dis-
count rate higher than the household rate of time preference, the optimal
outcomes for the tax rate and shaze of social infrastructure are unaffected.
The reeult that maximising growth is equivalent to maximising social
welfare is not robust to changes in the type of production function, even if
production remains characterised by constant returns to scale with respect
to private capital and productive government spending. In general, there
is a trade-off between the rate of growth and the (initial) level of private
consumption. For example, if equation (5) is replaced by a CES production
function,
Y-[a(ak')~ t(I - a)s"1~, n~ o, n ~ I (s~)
where e- (1-q)-t ~ 0 denotes the elasticity ofsubstitution between private
capital and productive government spending, one obtains:
~If non-diatortionazy lump-aum taxea are available, maximiaing growth requirea max-
imal taxation (r -~ 1, a-, 1- g). flowever, maximiaing the ratio of private con-
aumption to private capital requiree that the national iacome ahare of taxation ia lesa,
r- r' - va(I - a) G r' ~ 1, because the lump-sum character oftaxation doea not dam-
age growth proapecta, leavea leae room tor private conaumption and thue the government






a(s, r) - aL
(1 - r)aB (
as-a 1~- b - PJ
. (11')
`s-~}a-1J
In general, c, - 0 and fr, - 0 do not yield the same value of r- r', unless
rl - 0. Maximising social welfaze requires equation (15) to hold and thus is
not necessarily equivalent to maximising growth or maximising the initial
level of private consumption. Table 1 gives the results of some numerical
calculations.
Insert Table 1: Trade-off between growth and level of consumption
As the elasticity of intertemporal substitution (o) decreases from one
to a half, the rate of economic growth diminishes and the initial level of
private consumption increases irrespective of whether social welfare, growth
or the initial level of private consumption is maximised. A reduction in o
leads to a fall in the tax rate and share of productive government spending
when social welfare is maximised, but to an increase when the initial level
of private consumption is maximised. A reduction in o does not affect the
value of the tax rate which maximises the rate ofgrowth. A reduction in the
elasticity of substitution (c) induces a higher tax rate and share of productive
government spending and a lower rate of growth, irrespective of whether
social welfare, growth or the level of private consumption is maximised.
The level of private consumption decreases or increases in all three cases
depending on whether o- 2 or a- 1. The most interesting aspect of Table
1 is, however, that for c- z there is a trade-off between growth and the level
ofprivate consumption. The share of productive government spending which
maximises growth is 45.7 per cent and the share which maximises the level of
private consumption is only 35.7 per cent. The optimal share lies, of course,
in between these two values, which points to a trade-off between the rate
of growth and the level of private consumption. Barro (1990) had already
noted that, if the elasticity ofsubstitution exceeds unity, the national income
share of productive government spending that maximises welfare exceeds the
value that maximises the growth rate.lo
Departures from Cobb-Douglas production functions aze not the only
reason why maximising growth need not be efficient. For example, when
private production depends on the stock of productive government capital
rather than on the level of productive government spending, it is possible to
show that maximising growth is no longer efficient either. Another example
is when public goods are rival and excludable and household utility depends
on the level of government consumption (see Section 6). However, in the
remainder of this paper attention is restricted to Cobb-Douglas production
functions with productive government spending rather than the stock of
government capital as an argument.
4 7ï~ade-off between government consumption and
productive government spending
Now assume that government yields direct utility for households. Consider
thus the situation where the government maximises the political welfare
function (cf. Barro, 1990):
W- J
~exp(-At)[u(C(t))1-7(g(t)~))dt, (3 1 0,0 c ry G 1. (1')
0
The national income share of government consumption rather than the
level of government consumption affects household utility. This may be jus-
tified when government consumption ia a rival, non-excludable public good
which is subject to congestion s. Bazro and Sala-i-Martin (1990) argue that
many public goods (e.g. national parks, roads, water and sewer systems,
courts, and even national defense) are rival and non-excludable. A prob-
lem is that most of these goods typically have the character of productive
government investment as well as of government consumption. An excep-
tion is perhaps expenditures on national parks. In any case, most political
discussions are focused on the optimal national income share of government
consumption. Ií the government is far-sighted and not threatened by being
removed out oí ofïice, it adopts the same rate of time preference as house-
holds (p - p) and W- U. Ilowever, in general politicians are short-sighted
SSection 6 connidere the case when the government conanmes rival, ezcludable public
goods.11
because they may be removed from office by rival politicians (~3 ~ p). The
difference between the political rate oí discount and the private rate of dis-
count may be interpreted as the probability of being removed from office.
If the intertemporal elasticity of subatitution is unity, utility is sepazable
in the level of private consumption and the national income share of govern-
ment conaumption so that household behaviour ie unaffected by the latter.
In general, pteferences are not separable so that:
C(t)~C(t) - ( 1 - ry(1 - o)I
[r(t) - P] (3')
C(t) -
(ap-} (1 - ry)(1 - o)rl
[A(t) } f~exp[-r(v - t}]D(v)dv] (4')
` 1 - 7(1 - a) J !e
rop -(1 - ry)(1 - o)ó f[1 - oa - ry(1 - 0)](1 - r)Bsó~
c(s,r) - I` 1-ry(1-o)
(10")
~(s~ r) - `1 - 7(1 - v)) [(1 - r)aBs~ - á - P]. (11~~)
The main difference is that a greater preference for a high national íncome
share of government consumption (ry) induces, for low elasticities of intertem-
poral substitution (o C 1), private agents to postpone consumption and thus
leads to a higher rate of growth.
The government chooses both g and r to maximise social welfare:
Max ~ [c(r - g' r)r-rygry]1- á ~~ a~, o~ 1
s,, ,0-(1-7)(1-o)x(r-9,r) `0-1
(18)
Max ((1 - 7)log(c(r - 9, r)) f 71oB(g)1 } i(1 - 7)A(r - 9, r)1 a- 1. g., ` A J l a~ J,
(18')
The optimal trade-off between the utility derived from a high level of private
consumption and the utility derived from a high nationa] income share of
government consumption yields equations (16), (17) and12
[Q-(1-ry)(1- ó)x(r,g)1 ~~~(~,g)~
~ ~1 ~~ ~~~J t~a(r,g)-a(ls)
( 9) ry 9
Note that equations (16) and (17) hold, irrespective of what the values of
the political and private rates of discount aze.
To simplify matters, attentionis for the time being focused at the case of
a unit elasticity ofintertemporal substitution, so that equation (19) becomes
Q(~((T'~))~ t iry(r,9) f p`1 ry 7~ `9I - 0. (19~)
Hence, the marginal increase in utility of an additional unit oí government
consumption must equal the resulting fall in matginal utility of private con-
sumption plus the present value of the resulting tall in the real growth rate
of the economy.
Upon substitution of equation (17) into equation (19'), one obtains
Í~7 -(1-7)89~(1-a)(1-9)~~'~. a t (QI~)
Substitution of equation (17) into equation (10) yields
(19~~)
c- P t aB((1 - a)(1 - 9))". (20)
Equations (19") and (20) can, as long as there is an interior solution, be
solved to find the optimum values of the national income shares of private
and government consumption, c' and g', as functions oí p,(3, a, B and ry.
The remainder of this section analyses the case of far-sighted politicians
who are not threatened by being voted out of office (Q - p). The case
of short-sighted politicians is dealt with in Section 5. Figure 1 gives a
graphic solution. It does not matter whether g, r or s is represented on the
horizontal axis, since once g is known r and s follow from (16) and (17).
Equation (20) shows that the ratio of private consumption to private capital
decreases with the national income share of government consumption and
must exceed the pure rate of time preference. The left-hand side ofequation
(19r) increases with c and approaches the asymptote (ryQ~a) as c tends to13
infinity. The right-hand side of (19") takes on the value zero when g- 0,
then increases aA g incr~ascrs, roaches a maximum when g- a, subseqnentty
decreases as g increases, and finally takes on the value zero when g- 1.
Combining both results gives a hump-ahaped relationship for equation (19"),
as portrayed in Figure 1. Ifry is not too high, there are two points, E and A,
satisfying equations (19") and (20). However, point A does not correspond
to a maximum because it is on the part of the locus deacribing equation
(19") which defines a negative relationship between c and g and thus point
A violates the second-order condition for a maximum s. It follows that
point E corresponds to the values of c and g, which maximise social welfare.
Furthermore, the optimal value oí c exceeds p and that of g is less than a.
Insert Figure 1: Optimal trade-off between private consumption and gov-
ernment consumption
An increase in preferences for rival, non-excludable public goods (y)
moves equation (19n) down and shifts the equilibrium from E to E'. Hence,
a greater desire for government consumption of rival, non-excludable goods
leads to a higher level of government spending on these goods, but leads
to a lower national income share of productive government spending and a
higher tax rate. The result is that both the ratio of private consumption
to private capital falls and the growth rate of the economy talls so that the
level of private consumption falla on impact and subsequently growa at a
slower rate. Also, the ratio of private capital to output increases. If there is
no desire for Samuelson-style public goods (y - 0), one obtaina g' - 0 and
r'-1-a.
Note that, when the government chooses the optimal trade-off between
private and government consumption whilst ignoring the effects on growth,
the national income share of government consumption and the tax rate will
be too high and the national income share of productive government spend-
ing will be too low. The reason is that the negative effects of a high tax rate
on the growth are not considered (the left-hand side of equation (19") is ryc
which is larger than before).
"At the valuea of r and g which maximiae eocial welfare, the lett-hand side of equation
(19') muet be decreasing in g. Since i0 is aleo decresaing in c, the optimum muat be on
the upwsrd-sloping part of equation (19") in Figure 1. Thie ia why point A has perverse
comparative etatica and doea not correapond to an optimum.14
5 Short-sighted politicians favour government con-
sumption and reduce growth
Section 4 focused on the case of far-sighted politicians with no threat of
being removed out of office and a discount rate equal to the one used by
private agent (A - p). Here the consequences of short-sighted politicians
(p ~ p) are considered, again for the time being for the case oï a unit
elasticity of intertemporal substitution. The basic proposition will first be
demonstrated for the apecial case of no productive government apending on
infrastructure (a - 1, s- 0). In that case the ratio of private consumption
to private capital is given by the pure rate of time preference of households,
c- p, and the growth rate ia given by x(r) -(1 - r)B - 6- p. The
optimal trade-off between growth and government consumption requires that
-(1-y)x'(r) -(jryu'(g) must hold, because the government sets the annuity
value of the fall in growth arising from an increase in the tax rate equal to
the marginal utility of the resulting increase in government consumption.
It follows that r' -(~ry~]B(1 - ry)] and x' - B-~3 (~) - 6 - p. Hence,
when the priority the government attaches to a high national income share
of government consumption (ry) is high, the resulting tax rate is high and,
as this distorts the rental price of capital, the growth rate is low. The
main lesson, however, to be drawn from this special case is that ahort-
sighted politicians (~i higher than p) favour a higher national income share
of government consumption and thus levy a higher tax rate than far-sighted
politicians. As a result, short-sighted politicians damage growth prospects
for the economy 7.
In general, productive government spending on infrastructure boosta eco-
nomic growth (a G I). The effects of short-sighted politicians can then best
be seen írom examining the comparative statica of an increase in the gov-
ernment discount rate on the equilibrium portrayed in Figure 1. The locus
describing equation (20) shifta down, so that the optimum ehifts from E
to E'. Short-aighted politicians increase the national income share of gov-
ernment consumption at the expense of private consumption. Basically,
~Within the context ot a model ot tax-emoothing and government debt, it can be
ahown that ahort-aighted politiciana [avour government coneumption at the expenae ot
government inveatment and thua run up debt and induce an eroeion o[ the net worth of
the public aector (van der Plceg, 1990).15
short-sighted politicians favour high tax rates (1 - a(1 - g)) and low na-
tional income shares of productive government spending on infrastructure
((1 - a)(1- g)) because from the electoral point ofview they value high na-
tional income shazes of government consumption more than a high growth
rate of the economy. As a consequence, short-sighted politicians may be
blamed both for low levels of private consumption and for low growth rates
of the economy. Note that when the desire for Samuelson-style public goods
tends to zero (y -. 0), then g' -. 0 and r' -. 1- a irrespective of the value
of ~3 so that political effects eventually do not matter at all. Alternatively,
equation (19n) shows that as governments become extremely far-sighted and
discount very little (~i y 0), government consumption tends to zero (g -y 0)
in which case the optimal tax rate and national income share of productive
government spending tend to 1- a as well.
The top panel of Table 2 presents numerical calculations designed to il-
lustrate the sensitivity of the results ofthis and the previous section with re-
spect to the elasticity ot intertemporal substitution. It is comforting to note
that, even if the elasticity oï intertemporal substitution differs from unity,
short-aighted politicians favour a higher national income share of govern-
ment consumption, a lower national income shaze of productive government
spending and a higher tax rate and thus they can be blamed for a lower
level of private consumption, a lower growth rate and a lower level of wel-
fare for citizens. As before, a lower elasticity of intertemporal substitution
leads to a lower rate of growth and to a higher level of private consumption;
the government responds with a higher national income share of government
consumption and a lower share of productive government spending.
Insert Table 2: Short-sighted politicians damage growth prospects
6 Rival, excludable public goods
The analysis of Sections 4 and 5 assumes that public goods are rival and
non-excludable. Congestion means that it is the shase rather than the level
of government consumption which yields utility to households. However, if
congestion is unimportant and public goods are rival and excludable, it is
reasonable that the leve] of public consumption enters the political welfare
function:ls
W - ~~exp(-~3t)(u(C(t)1-'G(t)ry)]dt, A,y ~ 0.
0
The optimal values of g and r thus follow from:
~c(r - 9, r)1-7 (g(T - 9) ás9~ryj 1-é
M'~ (i3-~1-ó)A`(r-9,r)]~1-Jó~ a~l (21)
Maxl (1-7)log(c(T-9,T)~f71o8(9B(r-9)~)~}rA(rp~9,T)1 a- 1.
` ` J (21~)
The values of r and g defining the optimal trade-off between government
consumption and economic growth must for o- 1 satisíy:
A~(1 - y) (
c((r 9))I } y`1 a aI lr 1 9~J } A,(T, 9) - 0 (22)
(j((1-y)rcg(T,9)I
} `ry~-y`l aa~ `T 1 ~1 }A9(T,9)-0 (23)
l `(,9) 9 9
It is clear that, for a given level o( g, maximising growth is no longer equiv-
alent to maximising the ratio of private consumption to private capital and
a fortiori thus not equivalent to maximising social welfare. This means that
equations (16) and (17) do not follow from equation (22). Instead, it is
easy to prove from equations (lOT), (11"), (22) and (23) that s' - 1- a
and r' - 1- a-}- g. This result holds irrespective of what the values of
the political and social rates of discount are and of what the elasticity of
intertemporal substitution is. The intuition is that, when public goods are
rival and excludable, private and public goods can be treated as a composite
commodity and the Composite Commodity Theorem then says that one can
maximise social welfare with respect to this composite commodity and the
national income ehare of productive government spending.17
The optimal national income share of government consumption and the
optimal tax rate depend on political preferences, to be precise the polit-
ical rate of discount and the weight given to public rather than private
consumption (p and y), as well as on private preferences (p) and on tech-
nology (a). Furthermore, x, and c, must be negative so that the opti-
mal tax rate exceeds the one which prevails when it is the national income
share rather than the level of government consumption that affects welfare
(r' - 1-~fg ~ 1-~(1-g)). Similarly, thenationalincomeshareofproduc-
tive government spending is higher than before (s' - 1-a ~(1-a)(1-g)).
The reason is that the government no longer chooses the optimal tax rate to
maximise economic growth and the ratio of private consumption to private
capital, but that it gces beyond this. The government also considers the
beneficial effect on welfaze of a marginal increase in the tax rate and the na-
tional income share of productive government spending on the productivity
of capital and consequently on the rate of economic growth and welfare. In
effect, a higher rate of growth permits, for a given national income share, a
higher level of government consumption and this increases welfare.
Table 2 presents some numerical calculations to illustrate the robustness
of the results. When there is no congestion the optimal share of productive
government spending is higher, the optimal share of government consump-
tion is lower and consequently the growth rate is higher than when there is
no congestion, irrespective of whether the elasticity of intertemporal substi-
tution exceeds or is less than unity.
7 Conclusion
The implications of the new theories of endogenous growth for the optimal
determination of the national income sharea ofgovernment consumption and
of productive government apending on infrastructure have been analysed.
Economic growth is in these new theories no longer constrained by the sum
oí population growth and the exogenous growth on labour productivity,
but is endogenous when output is proportional to a broad measure of the
capital stock. Economic growth then depends positively on the national
income share of productive government spending in as far as this increases
the marginal productivity of private capital and negatively on the tax rate
as this teduces the return on private capital. If government consumption
dces not yield direct utility and the production function is of the Cobb-
Douglas variety, maximising gtowth is equivalent to maximising the ratio of18
private consumption to private capital and thus to maximising social welfare.
The resulting optimal tax rate increases less than proportionally with the
national income share of government consumption, but only depends on
lechnology and not on óousehold prefereuces.
This latter result is not robust under at least three circumstances. The
first occurs when production functions are more general (e.g. of the CES
variety). When the elasticity of substitution between private capital and
productive government spending is less than unity, the tax rate and share
of productive government spending are higher when growth is maximised
than when the current level of private consumption is maximised. The sec-
ond circumstance occurs when government capital rather than productive
government spending affects private production. The final one occurs when
government consumption affects social welfare directly. In general, there
is a trade-off between the current levels of private and~or public consump-
tion and the rate of growth of the economy so that maximal growth is not
necessarily efficient.
If public goods are rival and non-excludable (e.g. when congestion is im-
portant), it is reasonable that a high national income share of government
consumption contributes to social welfare. If public goods are rival and ex-
cludable, congestion is not important and consequently the optimal growth
rate ia higher than when public goods are rival and non-excludable. The
point is that when congestion ie perceived to be unimportant the govern-
ment finds it optimal to have a higher national income share oí productive
government spending and a lower share of government consumption, because
the adverse effects on growth and congestion are not internalised.
Politicians are short-sighted, especially when the probability of being
removed from office is high. This distorts their optimal policies in favour
of higher government consumption at the expense of lower productive gov-
ernment spending on infrastructure and higher taxes. As a result, the be-
haviour of short-sighted politicians reduces the growth rate of the economy
and jeopardises welfare of citizens.
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Table 1: Trade-off between growth and level of consumption
a - o - 1
E-; E- 1 E- 1 E- 1
Max U
U -83.99 -26.119 60.017 345.72
c 0.174 0.237 0.122 0.010
a 0.043 0.137 0.090 0.274
s 0.411 0.15 0.438 0.15
Ma~c C
U -91.88 -26.119 1.146 345.72
c 0.181 0.237 0.151 0.010
a 0.035 0.137 0.048 0.274
s 0.358 0.15 0.316 0.15
Max a
U -88.41 -26.119 58.886 345.72
c 0.161 0.237 0.115 0.010
a 0.045 0.137 0.091 0.274
s 0.457 0.15 0.457 0.15
Note: g- 0.25,r - s~-g,p - 0.025,8 - l,a - 0.8,6 - 0.21
Table 2: Short-sighted politicians damage growth prospects
Rival Non-Excludable Public Goods
o - 1 0 - 1
Q-P Q-2P Q-P Q-2P
W -39.313 -32.401 199.796 25.813
U -39.313 -39.436 199.796 51.627
c 0.196 0.189 0.126 0.121
g 0.233 0.257 0.045 0.087
s 0.153 0.149 0.191 0.183
r 0.386 0.405 0.236 0.269
a 0.188 0.180 0.379 0.357
Rival Excludable Public Goods
o- 0-1
Q-P Q-2P Q-P Q-2P
W -27.221 -24.413 500.640 95.817
U -27.221 -27.248 500.640 494.975
c 0.201 0.198 0.129 0.126
g 0.208 0.220 0.023 0.045
s 0.2 0.2 0.2 0.2
r 0.408 0.420 0.223 0.245
a 0.194 0.190 0.391 0.379
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